January 7, 2026 – The Honorable Frank A. Tinari of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County has dismissed a broker’s claim against a seller for a commission on the sale of a North Haven property, in Simon Harrison Real Estate, LLC v. 20 Forest Road LLC, Suffolk Index No. 610349/2024.

The plaintiff, Simon Harrison Real Estate, was a licensed real estate broker that was claiming to have earned a share of a commission for introducing the seller to a buyer whose contract was terminated before closing.  The seller did not have any agreement with Simon Harrison but had entered into an “Exclusive Right to Sell” agreement with the listing broker, Saunders & Associates.  When the property was later sold to a different buyer, Simon Harrison claimed that it was entitled to a share of the commission from the seller for introducing it to the first buyer, based on a “universal” co-brokerage agreement between Simon Harrison and Saunders.

When the seller moved for summary judgment to dismiss Simon Harrison’s claim, the court sided with the seller primarily on two grounds.   First, the court agreed with the seller that it had “no contract with [Simon Harrison], implied or express,” and the only commission agreement entered into by the seller was the “ERS” with Saunders.   Second, the court agreed that the ERS provided that a commission was “payable ONLY if, as and when title passes,” and it undisputed that title did not pass as between the buyer that Simon Harrison introduced to the seller.  The court also rejected Simon Harrison’s alternative theories based on “quantum meruit” and “unjust enrichment,” as well as “implied contract.”

EHADP represented the seller throughout the action.

December 17, 2025 – The firm is pleased to announce that Deanna Cinquemani has joined the firm as an Associate Attorney, as part of the firm’s estate planning practice group.

January 2025 – The Supreme Court, Suffolk County has put to rest a longstanding dispute alleging that a Town of Southampton boat ramp parcel was parkland, and thus inalienable, in Havemeyer v. Town of Southampton, Index No. 603640/2019.  The dispute stems from a 2017 agreement reached by the Town of Southampton and a neighboring property, who agreed to maintain the boat ramp property and reconfigure the owner’s driveway to create a better parking lot for boat ramp users as well as improved driveway access for the neighbor.  Three town-resident plaintiffs complained, however, that the Town’s agreement was invalid, because they believed that the boat ramp property was inalienable parkland and did not allow for the driveway reconfiguration.  After several years of litigation, the Supreme Court rejected the parkland claim and granted the neighbor’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, in a January 8, 2025 order.  EHADP represented the successful neighbor in the lawsuit.

On December 3, 2024 — a few weeks before the January 1, 2025 filing deadline for reporting companies existing prior to January 1, 2024 — a federal judge in Texas ruled that the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”) is unconstitutional and issued a nationwide preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the CTA. There have since been multiple appellate decisions regarding this injunction.  The US Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), which oversees collecting and maintaining beneficial ownership information in accordance with the CTA, has most recently stated that, “[i]n light of a recent federal court order, reporting companies are not currently required to file beneficial ownership information with FinCEN and are not subject to liability if they fail to do so while the order remains in force. However, reporting companies may continue to voluntarily submit beneficial ownership information reports.”  At this time there does not appear to be a consensus as to whether companies should voluntarily comply with the CTA requirements or delay filing their BOI Report until resolution of the court proceeding.  For more information on the CTA and the reporting requirements thereunder, please visit https://www.fincen.gov/boi

This alert is intended for informational purposes regarding a potential reporting requirement and is not intended to constitute legal advice.  Please consult with your corporate secretary or legal counsel about this reporting requirement, whether it affects you, and your responsibilities to ensure compliance with the CTA.

June 24, 2024 – The Supreme Court, Nassau County (Hon. James P. McCormack), issued a decision after trial in favor of the plaintiff easement holders, in Papalcure v. Canarick, Index. No. 612791/17.

The plaintiffs in the action, Papalcure and Schein, claimed to be the holders of an easement of the beach and bluff properties owned by the defendant, Paul Canarick, in the “Red Spring Colony” area of Glen Cove, NY.  The land had been set aside by the original developers, the Red Spring Land Co., in the late 1800s, as a common area for use and enjoyment of the subdivision owners.  In the mid-1900s, predecessor owners of both the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s properties went to trial over similar claims, and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s predecessors, in a case called Loening v. Red Spring Land Co., 198 Misc. 151 (1949).  Two appeals courts upheld the Loening decision — first the Appellate Division in 1950 (277 A.D. 1050) and then the Court of Appeals in 1951 (302 N.Y. 934).  Over 60 years later, the defendant claimed that he owned the property free and clear of any easement claims, in spite of the Loening decision.  He proceeded to block the plaintiffs’ access to the property, planted trees and shrubs to cut off their views of the water, and accused them of trespassing when they used the beach and bluffs as they had for many years.

On behalf of the plaintiffs, EHADP brought an action against the defendant in 2017, to obtain a declaration that the plaintiffs’ easement rights were valid, to enjoin the defendant from interfering with those rights, and to obtain damages for the defendant’s interference with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the easement.   The case reached trial in the summer of 2023, where it was tried over the course of nearly two weeks.

Justice McCormack’s Decision After Trial ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on all claims.

As to the existence of the easement, Justice McCormack found that the “outcome of this case is clear from the evidence presented.  Plaintiffs presented clear proof of the existence of the easement, and their use of it until Canarick began putting up impediments,” which not only prevented Plaintiffs from physically using the easement, but included “plantings that would completely block the water views from the Papalcure and Schein properties, while at the same time ensuring his own unimpeded view.”  Justice McCormack acknowledged the “unusual benefit of having a Court of Appeals decision directly related to these properties finding the easement existed,” and he declined the defendant’s invitation to find that it did not have to abide by the Court of Appeals’ precedent.

Justice McCormack also rejected the defendant’s claim to have extinguished the easement by adverse possession, finding that it “is clear that the property over which the easements are claimed was accessible, even if Canarick made it more inconvenient for Plaintiffs to do so.”

As to the easements, the decision concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment that their easement exists and that the defendant interfered with the plaintiffs’ right of access, as well as an injunction to direct the defendant to remove the fencing and plantings that impede the plaintiffs’ rights.

Last, Justice McCormack found that the plaintiffs also proved that the defendant’s interference with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their land constituted a private nuisance, entitling them to damages of over $300,000, and rising, until the impediments are removed.

April 3, 2024 – In a 15+ page decision, the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Hon. Maureen T. Liccione) has awarded a purchaser summary judgment on her claim for a return of her downpayment and attorneys’ fees, in Farrell v. Gardner, Index No. 613551/2022.  The case involved an $8 million contract to purchase a home in Sagaponack, NY, and, more specifically, customary “certificate of occupancy” (CO) and “as is” requirements found in many real estate contracts to sell Hamptons homes.  The home at issue was staged and shown with a finished third floor that included a bedroom and bathroom.  The purchaser paid an $800,000 downpayment on the contract, but the sellers, who had been aware that the third floor was illegal prior entering into the contracts, nonetheless agreed to deliver the premises in “as is” conditions, with a CO covering its improvements.  After the purchaser learned about the illegal third floor rooms, the sellers “gutted” the third floor by demolishing the bedroom and bathroom “and transforming the finished third floor into an enclosed unfinished attic space, all without permits.”  At the time-of-essence closing, the sellers insisted that they fulfilled their obligations under the contract by delivered the altered house and a 37 year old CO issued in 1985, before the illegal third floor conversion into a finished bedroom/bathroom space and before its subsequent gutting.  The purchaser, who appeared at the closing with the funds to complete the contract, refused to accept the property no longer in its “as is” condition, and without the promised CO.

In a thorough legal discussion addressing the interplay between the customary CO and “as is” contract requirements, the Supreme Court found “that: (1) Sellers breached the Contract by failing to deliver a valid and subsisting CO for the Property and could not deliver the Property in ‘as is’ condition at the closing, and (2) that Purchaser was ready, willing, and able to perform on the time of the essence closing date.”  The court agreed with the purchaser that the sellers were contractually required to deliver both a valid CO covering the buildings as they existed at contract and deliver the property in “as is” condition, but they failed to do either, because the 1985 CO was not valid on the day of closing and the property was no longer in its “as is” condition after the Sellers gutted the third floor.   Though the sellers argued “that it was impossible to deliver the house both in ‘as is’ condition and with a valid and subsisting CO,” the court found that this “argument actually underscores Purchaser’s claim that Sellers could not abide by the Contract terms requiring them to deliver the premises ‘as is’ and with a valid CO.”

After dismissing the sellers’ remaining arguments, the Supreme Court found that the purchaser was “entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as the Contract authorized the recovery of attorneys’ fees from the unsuccessful party.”

December 11, 2023 – The Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Hon. Frank A. Tinari), has granted a plaintiff summary judgment in a specific performance action involving property in Southold, in Alta Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Our Business, LLC, Index No. 611064/2020.  The action involved a pre-COVID contract of sale, which the defendant/seller refused to complete after the pandemic hit New York.  In the decision, the court rejected the seller’s attempt to avoid liability under the contract on the ground that a particular letter amendment adjourning the closing was intended to limit the seller’s liability to a return of the downpayment, because, under New York law, a “limitation of remedies ‘will not be implied and to be enforceable must be clearly, explicitly and unambiguously expressed in the contract.'”  The court then found that the plaintiff/purchaser proved that it was ready, willing, and financially able to close on the contract, and that it reasonably set a “time of essence” closing, which the seller refused to complete.  Finally, the court awarded the plaintiff its attorney’s fees because the contract included a specific clause entitling the prevailing party to recover its fees.